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Between 1892 and 1960, most suicide verdicts rendered during coroners’ inquests 
labelled death by a person’s own hand as “suicide while of unsound mind.” During 
this period, psychiatrists increasingly determined the degree to which individuals 
who attempted to kill themselves could be considered criminally responsible 
for their actions or not responsible by reason of mental illness. To elucidate 
this gradual transition from state to medical authority over suicide in Canada, 
we analyse narratives of responsibility found in “suicide notes” appended to 
coroners’ inquests, particularly ways in which the act of suicide was construed by 
individuals who committed suicide as a rational decision or an individual right 
and not as a moment of madness or a criminal act.
Entre 1892 et 1960, la plupart des verdicts de suicide attribués à la fin d’une 
enquête du coroner nomment le fait de se donner la mort comme « un suicide dans 
un moment de folie ». Au cours de cette même période, les psychiatres vont être 
amenés à déterminer de plus en plus le niveau de responsabilité de personnes qui 
ont attenté à leur vie, à savoir si ces dernières peuvent être tenues criminellement 
responsable de leur geste ou au contraire déresponsabilisé pour cause de troubles 
mentaux. Pour tenter de réfléchir plus en avant sur cette transition graduelle de 
la gestion pénale à la gestion médicale du suicide au Canada, nous avons analysé 
les récits de responsabilité dans les « lettres de suicide » jointes au dossier de 
l’enquête du coroner, particulièrement la manière dont le geste suicidaire a été 
construit comme un acte rationnel ou basé sur la base de droits individuels par 
les personnes qui se sont enlevées la vie en opposition à un moment de folie ou 
un acte criminel.
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ON DECEMBER 28, 1932, a man living in Montreal addressed the following 
instructions to the coroner who, as this man was aware, investigated and passed 
judgement on every death that occurred in the city:
Dear Sir: If you are called on to investigate my remains and the causes that would 
from a living being be a deceased, I hereby warn you that no one should be accused 
of my death.
It is freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of my actions that I take my life....
As a representative of a so-called human justice, the law authorizes you to consider 
this act of freeing myself as a criminal offense. … To you, I say simply this. Humans 
take refuge in death with or without reason. If a man commits suicide without 
reason, it is because he is deranged, and the penalty is unjust and ineffective in 
cases of madness. If a man frees himself from life with reasons that motivate his act, 
these reasons are mainly threefold: illness, poverty, and finally sorrow stemming 
from a broken heart and a broken spirit. … If the justice system has rights over the 
individual I am obliged to tell you that it goes beyond those rights in many cases.1
Even though it is not accurate to believe that suicide was considered as a crime 
in 1932 in Canada, attempted suicide was a punishable crime under the Criminal 
Code of Canada until 1972.2 During the first half of the twentieth century, people 
who committed suicide expressed awareness of the offensive nature of their 
actions, some believing that they were committing a crime. As illustrated in the 
above excerpt from a so-called “suicide note,” such individuals emphasized their 
desire, free will, or right to end their lives for reasons unconnected to the state’s 
laws and criminal justice system. Writers of suicide notes in early twentieth-
century Canada, moreover, also routinely challenged the notion that suicide could 
be considered an act of madness.
 This dual reference to suicide and attempted suicide as both a criminal and 
insane act emerged from developments during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, during which religious discourses that had influenced state policies 
and legal decisions regarding suicidal behaviour were progressively displaced 
by psychiatric discourses in the twentieth century.3 Whereas within religious 
1 Quebec National Archives [hereafter QNA], Coroner’s Inquests, Court of General Sessions of the Peace 
Archive, Quebec City District, 1908-1986, Fund TP 12, S 1, SS 26, SSS1, 1932, File no. 2082, man, 43 
years old.
2 Punishable under common law before the passage of section 238 of the first Criminal Code of Canada 
(CCC) of 1892, attempted suicide was punished under section 213 of the CCC from 1954 until its 
decriminalization in 1972. Suicide was not included in this first CCC, even though this behaviour was 
considered as a crime under the British law in force until then.
3 For Alvaro Pires, the notion of discourse (or a discursive formation) refers to a cognitive structure or to 
a discursive system having the following characteristics: 1) it has an historical-cultural dimension, that 
is to say, it represents a strong concentration of meaning; 2) it continues in time; 3) it is macrosocial; 
4) it can contain internal tensions, options, and bifurcations; 5) it is institutionalized by a system of 
communications and practices; 6) it tightly binds facts and social values; 7) it sees itself as knowledgeable; 
8) it is socially available and more or less understood according to the period under consideration. These 
characteristics also apply in relation to other forms of behaviour defined as deviant, notably homosexuality. 
See Alvaro Pires, “La recherche qualitative et le système pénal. Peut-on interroger les systèmes sociaux” 
in Dan Kaminski and Michel Kokoreff, eds., Sociologie pénale : système et expérience (Ramonville Saint-
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discourses the belief in the sanctity of life originally legitimated the criminalization 
of suicide during the ancient regime (and its decriminalization de facto in the 
late eighteenth century4), voluntary death was gradually medicalized, redefined 
as the result of temporary madness or chronic insanity according to psychiatric 
experts and their medical discourses on mental illness.5 An abundant literature 
testifies to the growing importance of alienism, as psychiatry was then called, 
in the explanation and management of certain so-called “deviant” behaviours.6 
Suicide and attempted suicide were such behaviours. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the terms and concepts used to describe suicidal behaviours were 
increasingly derived from the language of psychiatry. The first Criminal Code of 
the Dominion of Canada, adopted in 1892, codified this psychiatric exemption 
for attempted suicide. It stated that a person accused of attempted suicide was 
to be declared “not guilty” in cases of insanity (section 11) and detained under 
medical supervision until further notice by the governor of the province.7 From 
the perspective of authoritative discourses – in this case legal and psychiatric – 
this new code constituted an important shift in social reactions to voluntary death 
and the suicidal individual. The act was no longer straightforwardly immoral or 
criminal, and was now conceptualized as a pathological state that required medical 
evaluation and intervention to understand and prevent it.8
 This paper focuses on the testimony and self-expression of individuals who 
committed suicide and, especially, on those who refused to have their final act 
“distorted” by institutional authorities represented by coroners, physicians, or 
police. Many of these individuals were fully aware of the self-murder they were 
about to commit and wanted to claim full responsibility for their actions. Before 
Agne: Éditions Érès, 2004), p.188. On process of decriminalization and medicalization, see also Patrice 
Corriveau, “Religious and Medical Discourses at the Core of the Legitimization Process of Penal Law. The 
Management of Homoerotic Mores in Quebec (1892-1969),” Champ pénal / Penal Field, vol. 4 (2007) 
and Judging Homosexuals: A History of Gay Persecution in Quebec and France (Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 2011).
4 A paper focusing on the verdicts in the Montreal coroners’ inquests between 1767 and 1986 is forthcoming 
from the authors. The preliminary data from an analysis of the archives from the Montreal Coroner’s Office 
for this period show that verdicts of felony – for example, “being thereunto seduced by the Devil on the 
Morning ... feloniously ... voluntarily of his malice brought himself killed” (QNA, 1768, B.118) – were 
replaced by verdicts in which suicide was attributed to mental illness such as “non compos mentis – being 
sound of mind, memory and understanding but lunatic and distracted ... did kill himself” (QNA, 1816, no. 
112) and “suicide in a moment of insanity” (QNA, 1842, no. 594).
5 See John Weaver, Sorrows of a Century: Interpreting Suicide in New Zealand (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014) and A Sadly Troubled History: The Meanings of Suicide in the 
Modern Age (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
6 See, for example, Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité. La volonté de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1976); 
Ian Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness: Professionalization and Psychiatric Knowledge in Nineteenth-
Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Jan Goldstein, Console and Classify: 
The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1987); Arnold Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of 
Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
7 Criminal Code of Canada as Amended in 1893 (Toronto: Carswell Co., 1893), section 736: 860.
8 See, for example, the field of suicidology founded in 1968 by Edwin S. Shneidman, PhD. The American 
Association of Suicidology (AAS) promotes research, public awareness programmes, public education, 
and training for professionals and volunteers. See Edwin Shneidman, ed., Suicidology: Contemporary 
Developments (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1976). In addition, AAS serves as a national clearinghouse 
for information on suicide. See http://www.suicidology.org/home.
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committing suicide, they prepared written statements in which they expressed 
their views or wishes explicitly. These texts, commonly called suicide notes, were 
often rendered in political, provocative, or deeply personal terms. Whereas some 
penned simple suicide notes to absolve friends and family of any responsibility and 
to assuage their grief, others exploited the opportunity of producing a suicide note 
to object to the labelling of suicide as evidence of insanity – as an act committed 
“while of unsound mind.” The legal designation of “unsound mind” likely 
emerged from efforts by law-makers to alleviate the moral shame traditionally 
cast on those who committed suicide. Nevertheless, this study shows that the label 
was sometimes rejected by those who planned to commit suicide and did not wish 
to endure the equally shameful stigma that accompanied a diagnosis of insanity, 
maybe because it implied moral and genetic defects in the family tree. Indeed, in 
written testimonies many took pains to emphasize that they were of sound mind 
when they decided to end their lives, carefully describing their rationale and mental 
state immediately before they acted. Whether abjuring criminal or psychiatric 
explanations of their intentions to die voluntarily, these individuals claimed full 
responsibility before proceeding, a significant consequence of the rising influence 
of psychiatric discourses within twentieth-century policy discussions of suicide.
 This study relies on 3,856 records from the Montreal Coroner’s Office in the 
province of Quebec dated 1892 to 1960, in which the coroner’s inquest led to 
“death by suicide.” Since the British conquest of New France in 1760, a coroner’s 
inquest has been convened to rule on suspicious or violent deaths in the province, 
including cases of reported suicide. These legal reports contained all available 
evidence by which the coroner conducted the investigation (the verdict of suicide 
was made by a jury until 1968), which could include written testimony prepared 
by the deceased individual. From these records, we have located, catalogued, and 
analysed 482 suicide notes.9 A majority of the authors of these texts apologized 
for the trouble caused by their actions; some blamed specific individuals; many 
simply wished to say a final goodbye to loved ones. In this study, we examine 24 
suicide notes, written between 1892 and 1960, in which the writer wished to take 
full responsibility for his or her actions, denying any supposed state of mental 
unsoundness that implied lack of rationality or personal accountability.10 Given 
the nature of our sampling, it is difficult to come to conclusions with respect to 
socio-demographic information. In the interest of full transparency and diligence, 
we share these details in Table 1.
9 We have catalogued almost 500 letters and notes, located in 4.8 per cent of all coroner records. This 
proportion may seem small, but its size can be explained in many ways, for example the high rate of 
illiteracy during the time period in question and the fact that some notes mentioned in the record cannot be 
found (because they were lost, stolen, or given back to the family).
10 Again, 24 letters out of 482 may seem negligible. Yet is it truly surprising that few individuals address 
“regimes of truth” before ending their lives? See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, la généalogie et l’histoire” 
in S. Bachelard et al., eds., Hommage à Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971). A 
discursive analysis of these catalogued letters is forthcoming, but what interests us here are the letters that 
demonstrated an opposition to institutional discourses.
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Table 1: Socio-demographic Details of Sample of 24 Writers of Suicide Notes
 Year-Record number Sex Age Race Marital status Profession
1 1932-2082 Man 43  White Single Notary
2 1913-599 Man 40  White Single 
3 1921-1178 Man Young Black Single 
4 1930-313 Man 35  White Single Taxi driver  
     (Unemployed)
5 1931-615 Man 60  White Widower 
6 1932-316 Woman 24  White Single 
7 1954-834 Woman 25  White Married  Waitress 
    (separated) 
8 1937-105 Man 61  White Married Daily worker CPR
9 1934-369 Man 68  White Married Works at  
     “Maritimes”
10 1916-717 Man Elderly White  
11 1927-1107 Man 50  White  
12 1914-211 Man Young White Married 
13 1928-533 Man 62  White Married 
14 1953-2425 Man 30  White Single Unemployed
15 1921-484 Man 78  White  
16 1942-514 Woman 33  White Widowed 
17 1951-1172 Man 48  White Married (?) Barber
18 1900-863 Man  29  White Separated 
19 1925-813 Man 33  White Separated 
20 1928-126 Woman 38  White Married 
21 1931-997 Man 42  White Married 
22 1933-1739 Man 24  White  Farmer
23 1958-2281 Man 60  White Married Lawyer
24 1959-4306 Man 47  White  
 As the sociologists Howard Becker – in his study on deviancy – and Erving 
Goffman – in his research on psychiatric institutions – have demonstrated, it 
is important that our analyses extend beyond the “hierarchy of credibility” by 
lending a voice to those not in positions of power and authority, disrupting the 
elite’s monopoly on truth.11 As researchers, we must revive the “voiceless,” that 
is, those who are marginalized, committed to an institution, incarcerated, or 
considered deviant, the very individuals who are defined and labelled as such by 
dominant discourses, in this case those who commit suicide.12 Our approach is 
11 Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Free Press, 1963); Erving 
Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York: 
Doubleday, 1961).
12 Michel Foucault, “La vie des hommes infâmes” in Foucault, Dits et Écrits III (1976-1979) (Paris: 
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based on a comprehensive paradigm in which the meanings given to suicide take 
shape through the words and actions of social actors, rather than being attributed 
solely by the institutions of social control.13 Like the social scientist Katrina 
Jaworski, we feel it is necessary to “understand suicide as relational, and thereby 
as never outside discourse and power relations.”14 It is all the more important, 
then, to account for the voices of those who are about to take their own lives and to 
call attention to a discourse that stands apart from that of authority figures whose 
social roles include identifying the act as a suicide.
The Psychiatric Explanation: Denying Criminal Responsibility
The emergence of psychiatry as a new dominant discourse in European thinking in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought about a progressive change in 
attitudes toward suicide: a new connection between voluntary death and madness. 
In Great Britain after 1843, the McNaughton Rules – a set of legal guidelines 
for adjudicating the criminal liability of defendants deemed insane – denied both 
criminal intent and responsibility of those who were seen as mad, for example 
people who committed suicide.15 Though formally under British jurisdiction, 
French Canadian psychiatrists espoused then-dominant theories on suicide 
popular in continental Europe, in particular the ideas of French alienists Étienne 
Esquirol (1838) and Jules Falret (1822).16 To highlight the strong views of these 
expert alienists, let us consider Esquirol’s own words, written in 1838: “Suicide 
being an act consecutive to the delirium of the passions or insanity, I ought 
to have little to say respecting the treatment of a symptom; a treatment which 
belongs to the therapeutics of mental diseases....”17 Not only did Esquirol and 
many of his European peers consider self-harm a symptom of mental disease and 
therefore potentially amenable to therapeutic intervention, they also condemned 
Gallimard, 1994 [1977]).
13 Jack Douglas, The Social Meanings of Suicide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Jean Baechler, 
Les suicides (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1975); Francine Gratton with the collaboration of Jacques Lazure, Les 
suicides d’être de jeunes québécois (Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1996); Francine Gratton, 
“La théorisation ancrée pour proposer une explication du suicide des jeunes” in Henri Dorvil and Robert 
Mayer, eds., Problèmes sociaux, vol. 1 (Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2001), pp. 305-334; 
Weaver, Sorrows of a Century and A Sadly Troubled History; Jean-Louis Pan Ké Shon, “Enfermement 
et suicides au début du 21e siècle. Approche compréhensive à partir de la dernière lettre des suicidés en 
prison,” Sociologie, vol. 4, no. 2 (2013), pp. 139-162.
14 Katrina Jaworski, “The Author, Agency and Suicide.” Social Identities – Special Issue: Foucault, 25 Years 
On, vol. 16, no. 5 (2010), p. 684. The study of the coroners’ reports sometimes reveals differences between 
a coroner’s official verdict and that of the jury, or of the witnesses interviewed during the coroner’s 
investigation.
15 Re Daniel M’Naghten, 8 ER 718, House of Lords, 1843.
16 Étienne Esquirol, Des maladies mentales considérées sous les rapports médical, hygiénique et médico-
légal (Paris: J.-B. Baillière, 1838); Étienne Esquirol, Mental Maladies: A Treatise on Insanity, trans., 
with additions by E. K. Hunt, MD (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845); Jean-Pierre Falret, De 
l’hypocondrie et du suicide. Considérations sur les causes, sur le siège et le traitement de ces maladies, 
sur les moyens d’en arrêter les progrès et d’en prévenir le développement (Paris: Croullebois, 1822). Until 
the inter-war period, French-Canadian psychiatrists tended to espouse the dominant French theories. See 
Isabelle Perreault, “Psychiatrie et ordre social. Analyse des causes d’internement et des diagnotics donnés 
à Saint-Jean-de-Dieu dans une perspective de genre, 1920-1950” (PhD dissertation, Department of History, 
University of Ottawa, 2009).
17 Esquirol, Mental Maladies, p. 307.
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the incarceration of individuals who attempted suicide.18 Based on the notion that 
it was an act committed while of unsound mind, they utilized their influence to 
advocate the decriminalization of people who attempted to take their own lives. 
This new foray of psychiatric expertise into the legal domain in the early part 
of the nineteenth century had lasting effects not only in Britain and Europe, but 
also within many provinces of the new Canadian state.19 Almost a century after 
Esquirol and the McNaughton Rules, for example, a Quebec psychiatrist named 
Georges Villeneuve recommended to the province’s Attorney-General in 1913 
that legal proceedings against his patient who had attempted suicide be stayed 
because he was of unsound mind:
This young man had attempted suicide. As he was of unsound mind at the time, 
he must not be considered criminally responsible for the act he committed. As his 
return to prison and his appearance in court could have a detrimental effect on his 
mental health, I would be very pleased if the Honourable Attorney-General were to 
accept to file a brief nolle prosequi allowing the young [Michel] to be sent directly 
back [to] the asylum.20
Villeneuve’s assistant, Eugene Devlin, offered a similar argument when he 
wrote in 1921 about another young man accused of attempted suicide who 
“was of unsound mind at the time of the offense for which he is charged, and 
he cannot, consequently, be held responsible.”21 Once strictly criminal offences, 
during the second half of the nineteenth century suicide and attempted suicide 
were increasingly defined and managed in terms of psychiatric, rather than legal, 
discourse.
 This transition from religious and legal to psychiatric discourses on the will 
to end one’s own life, however, was far from consistent. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, some Quebec doctors refused to intervene in cases of attempted 
suicide, as the following example taken from the record of a 1925 coroner’s 
inquest suggests. Summoned to a Montreal hotel where a man had been found 
in his room with his throat cut, a doctor refused to tend to the wound or even 
enter the room. “I was told that a man had attempted suicide,” he testified to the 
coroner. “I didn’t go straight up immediately, I told myself I’ll call the chief of 
police.” The doctor waited to accompany the police chief to the room, at which 
time he saw “the accused, on a chair with a gash in his throat.” Having been 
told by those who discovered the bleeding man that it was a suicide attempt, this 
doctor labelled the situation a crime scene that fell, firstly, within the jurisdiction 
of the police regardless of whether immediate medical intervention might have 
18 Laurence Guignard, Juger la folie. La folie criminelle aux Assises (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
2010).
19 Kimberley White, Negotiating Responsibility: Law, Murder, and States of Mind (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2008).
20 Mental Health Institute of Montreal Archives [hereafter MHIMA], Clinical Record, Record no. 18347. 
Nolle prosequi, or the stay of proceedings, is also a discretionary act, the exercise of which is a right given 
to the crown prosecutor by the legislator (Criminal Code of Canada, section 579).
21 MHIMA, Record no. 15290.
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prevented death.22 The doctor’s decision resonated with opinions expressed by 
Wilfrid Derôme (1919), a physician and professor of medical jurisprudence, 
for whom suicide remained “a murder against oneself” – even if madness was, 
according to Derôme, the primary factor that led an individual to carry out the 
act.23
 The transfer of the practical management of attempted suicide cases from 
legal to medical authorities occurred progressively, intensifying during the inter-
war period. An analysis of Quebec court cases dealing with attempted suicide at 
the turn of the twentieth century shows that judges relied very little on medical 
expertise when delivering a verdict or a sentence. In the management of “suicidal 
deviants,” the involvement of city authorities, family members, or even the 
Catholic Church – which played a fundamental role in Quebec’s social cohesion at 
the time – figured more importantly in legal decisions.24 Historian André Cellard 
and criminologists Élise Chapdelaine and Patrice Corriveau observe that, until the 
1930s, judges did not utilize psychiatric evaluations of defendants to make rulings. 
They write that “the idea of ‘temporary madness’ at the time the act was carried 
out was certainly present, but it served mainly as a legal argument to determine 
the sentence, [not as an argument to drop the charges]. What is more, the label 
was attributed by the jury and/or the coroner, rather than following an in-depth 
psychiatric examination.”25
 Not until the inter-war period, and even after the Second World War, were 
mental health experts increasingly called upon by the Quebec justice system to 
subject defendants to psychiatric evaluations to determine the degree of personal 
culpability for suicidal behaviour or, by contrast, to recommend that an individual 
be excused from criminal responsibility because of an impaired mental condition. 
Based on these evaluations from psychiatrists, an individual who had attempted 
suicide could be subject to medical rather than punitive intervention. The transcript 
of a letter sent by a prison psychiatrist named Adrien Plouffe in 1926 to the police 
magistrate is indicative of the increasing number of medical experts who believed 
that responsibility for those accused of attempted suicide should fall to physicians 
working in psychiatric institutions. “I found her to be of unsound mind, suffering 
from paranoid ideation, dangerous to herself and to society,” Plouffe testified. “[I]
n my opinion, it is urgent that she be committed to an asylum.”26
 Psychiatrists routinely lobbied the courts to reduce prison sentences for those 
arrested for self-harm, minimizing the responsibility of the accused based on 
psychiatric explanations of the behaviour. They also considered that those who 
attempted or committed suicide were not in full possession of their mental faculties 
at the time of their actions. Since the mid-nineteenth century, this interpretation 
22 QNA, 1925, no. 1427.
23 Wilfrid Derôme, “Étude sur le suicide,” L’Union médicale du Canada, vol. 48, no. 11 (1919), pp. 565-566.
24 Jean Hamelin and Nicole Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme québécois. Le XXe siècle, vol. 1 (Montréal: 
Boréal, 1984), pp. 1898-1940.
25 André Cellard, Élise Chapdelaine, and Patrice Corriveau, “‘Des menottes sur des pansements’ : la 
décriminalisation de la tentative de suicide dans les tribunaux du Québec entre 1892 et 1972,” Revue 
canadienne droit et société, vol. 28, no. 1 (2013), p. 87.
26 MHIMA, Record no. 18322, 1926.
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of reasons leading individuals to take their own lives was, in fact, widespread in 
the verdicts found in Quebec’s coroners’ inquiries to determine cause of death.27 
Indeed, even when individuals who committed suicide invoked external reasons to 
explain their mental distress (for example, marital problems or financial troubles) 
and who generally appeared to be of sound mind, coroners, juries, and those 
close to the defendant typically alleged that he or she had exhibited “a moment 
of madness or insanity,” however temporary. As the twentieth century progressed, 
suicidal behaviour was increasingly explained in terms of psychiatric illness by 
both legal and medical authorities.28
 The emergence and consolidation of psychiatric discourses as a paradigm for 
explaining suicide, as well as for determining who should assume responsibility in 
cases of attempted suicide, was, therefore, progressive at the time. Excerpts taken 
from the 1930s medical records of Montreal’s Saint-Jean-de-Dieu psychiatric 
hospital show that many social actors continued to view suicide and attempted 
suicide as problematic behaviours. For example, in many cases individuals 
accused of attempted suicide were imprisoned before being transferred to this 
psychiatric institution: “The patient seeks to take her own life to escape the abuse 
to which she was subjected. In prison, she talks to herself continuously. … She is 
accused of attempted suicide, but police authorities did not see fit to provide me 
with further information.”29 Throughout the twentieth century, social reactions to 
suicidal behaviour nevertheless shifted from the legal to the psychiatric domain 
within courts of law, with psychiatrists increasingly called upon to evaluate cases 
of attempted suicide. This shift led to a de facto decriminalization well before 
suicide was removed from Canada’s criminal code in 1972.30 In this respect, the 
language and actions of French Canadian psychiatrists in the inter-war period and 
immediately thereafter evinced the growing demand for medical treatment and 
management of people attempting to commit self-murder. What remains to be 
seen is how, in final written testimonies, individuals who successfully ended their 
own lives variously interpreted their actions in light of both legal and psychiatric 
institutional discourses.
Accepting Responsibility for Suicide
Among the examples taken from our empirical data, we find letters in which 
individuals who committed suicide expressed awareness of their “self-murder.” 
When it came to interpreting and reacting to people who wanted to end their 
own lives during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, criminal punishment 
—rooted as it was in morality and religious discourses—predominated. Indeed, 
27 The verdicts found in coroners’ inquiries vary depending on the particular views of the person who was 
chief coroner of the Montreal district at any given time. The earliest verdicts that systematically mention 
“suicide while of unsound mind” were delivered in the inquiries conducted by a medical examiner named 
Wyatt Johnston after 1892. During the first half of the twentieth century, various verdicts referring to 
madness or insanity were found in the coroner files, with one exception: those made by Lorenzo Prince, 
an attorney by trade who held the position in the 1920s and 1930s. In his files, the suicides’ verdicts by the 
jury were almost always named “personal or voluntary destruction.”
28 Ian Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, History and Truth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
29 MHIMA, Record no. 22655, 1931.
30 Cellard, Chapdelaine, and Corriveau, “‘Des menottes sur des pansements’.”
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suicide earned legal and moral condemnation in French Canadian society and 
was thus a source of disgrace. Suicidal behaviour could be viewed as non compos 
mentis (unsound mind) in the early 1800s, but it remained primarily associated 
with felo de se (felony) until the mid-nineteenth century.31 In several suicide notes, 
writers expressed the hope that authorities investigating their deaths would rapidly 
conclude that the “violent death”—as opposed to “natural death”—in question 
was voluntary so that no third party need be accused. Knowing their actions 
could cause problems for people around them, these individuals provided explicit 
written testimony with the hope of protecting others from criminal liability. The 
following are a few examples:
No one other than myself must be held responsible for my death.32
Inform the chief of Police that G… Calloway is “Dead by is own hand.”33
This is to certify that there is no one but me who is responsible in this affair. The 
reason for my crime is this. It is that I am a poor unfortunate man who has no luck 
wherever I am.34
If an accident should happen to me do not blame anybody for it. I did it myself. 
[name]. There is nobody to notify. No relatives at all.35
It is a suicide. No one is to be blame [sic]. I am responsible.36
In case of an accident I alone am responsible.37
With regard to claiming sole personal responsibility, the following suicide note is 
especially instructive:
I insist on making this declaration so that nobody has even a shadow of a doubt that 
there is one or some people that committed this act it is myself and myself alone that 
did it with my full knowledge and a sound mind. Blame must not be cast on any 
other than myself and myself alone....38
Some addressed the coroner directly, while others addressed the police, knowing 
their act could have serious financial and social consequences for the people 
around them.39 Interestingly, these writers were aware of the investigation that 
31 In the Montreal coroner’s records, we find verdicts of felo de se until 1860. Though criminal law still 
considered suicide a crime, it seems that the actors within the justice system interpreted this type of offence 
differently and were quick to explain the act in psychiatric terms, thus anticipating future legislation on the 
issue.
32 QNA, 1913, no. 599, man, 40 years old.
33 QNA, 1921, no. 1178, man, young.
34 QNA, 1930, no. 313, man, 35 years old.
35 QNA, 1931, no. 615, man, 60 years old.
36 QNA, 1932, no. 316, woman, 24 years old.
37 QNA, 1954, no. 834, woman, 25 years old.
38 QNA, 1937, no. 105, man, 61 years old.
39 A.-R. Gagné, “Le suicide et l’assurance-vie,” Assurances, vol. 8, no. 2 (1940), pp. 61-65.
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would follow their deaths, showing they were not indifferent to the social reaction 
of public authorities. One individual wrote to both the coroner and chief of 
police in separate suicide notes, with distinctive content and instructions for each 
addressee. To the coroner, for example, he said nothing concerning the act he was 
about to commit and wrote simply to ask a favour: “To Mr. Coroner Prince. Please 
deliver a verdict with the least possible publicity.” To the chief of police, on the 
other hand, he requested that he himself be held responsible for his actions: “To 
the Chief of Police. I, myself is [sic] to blame for this I would ask you as a favor to 
keep the whole affair as quiet as possible and with the less [sic] publicity possibly 
and you will greatly oblige.”40
 These notes also suggest that writers of suicide notes contemplated the private 
and taboo nature of the act. The same is true of another man who requested that the 
coroner not make his actions public. He wrote: “An incurable disease has induced 
me to end my suffering. … Out of pity for my only son, M.G.C. Mark who is 
married and a farmer in Rougemont that [sic], but that I no longer saw, because 
we did not get along, I would ask you to avoid all publicity but inform him of 
my passing.”41 Another individual left instructions to the person in charge of his 
remains: “To whom it may concern: Please give this discovery as little publicity as 
possible and have these remains sent to Wrays Mountain St.”42 Wishes regarding 
the disposition of the remains were also expressed by others. It is important to 
emphasize the realistic expectations of certain individuals who recognized that 
suicide was an infamous act and made the unusual request that his or her body be 
handed over to science or incinerated: “To the chief of Police. I am writing you this 
to ask you to take care of my wife. … p.s. give my body to the faculty at McGill. 
I am sure I will make a good subject for study.”43 Or: “Coroner, My body is to be 
handed over to the Cooperative Funeral Expense Society and my remains are to 
be cremated and no funeral held.”44 Notably, dissection and cremation remained 
unpopular choices for dealing with bodily remains in a predominantly Catholic 
province.45
 In addition to appeals for privacy and other post-mortem requests, in some cases 
individuals asked authorities to disguise the nature of their death by declaring it, 
unofficially, an accident to circumvent the inevitable turmoil caused by a suicide 
in the family. Others made the same request of family members. One man wrote 
to his sister:
[I]t would be preferable seeing as I have heart trouble and to hide it all to everyone 
so the news doesn’t come to dad, that the verdict of death be syncope, or the similar. 
Rose show the doctor this paper (turn). … I took 75 medinal [sic]. Rose, if you don’t 
40 QNA, 1934, no. 369, man, 68 years old.
41 QNA, 1916, no. 717, man, elderly.
42 QNA, 1927, no. 1107, man, 50 years old.
43 QNA, 1914, no. 211, man, young.
44 QNA, 1928, no. 533, man, 62 years old.
45 Martin Robert, “Disposer de son cadavre. La naissance de la crémation au Québec (1874-1914)” (MA 
thesis, History, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2014).
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like the way I fixed this, you know I can’t prevent you from doing otherwise, but it’s 
not bad, study it, you’ll see.46
For the most part, these notes were written before the Second World War. They 
suggest that many individuals viewed suicide as an act that defied normative values. 
The note written by a man named Laval (whose words we quoted as an epigraph) 
mentioned that he believed he was committing a crime, showing the degree to 
which taking one’s own life was stigmatized at that time. “The law authorizes you 
to consider this act of freeing myself as a criminal offense,” Laval told authorities 
before killing himself. “If the justice system has rights over the individual I am 
obliged to tell you that it goes beyond those rights in many cases.”47 While we can 
only speculate as to each writer’s intentionality, we note that many took up their 
pens to write directly and explicitly to state authorities to claim full responsibility 
for their suicides. Notes may, as we said earlier, have been written to prevent 
prosecution of someone who helped or could have been suspected of helping. Our 
reading of the files left us with the impression that, in writing notes, those who 
committed suicide positioned themselves against the increasing medicalization/
psychiatrization of suicide, which was aimed at relieving such individuals of all 
criminal responsibility in cases of failed attempts.
Of Sound Mind: Resistance to Psychiatric Explanations of Suicide
The analysis of the content of suicide notes over a 60-year period illuminates 
yet another element of the transition from criminal to psychiatric explanations 
of suicide behaviours: that the anticipated insinuation of supposed insanity or 
“unsound mind” bothered some individuals who intended to end their own lives. 
With origins in the many large public mental asylums built in North America 
throughout the nineteenth century, a new clinical discipline of psychiatry emerged 
in the opening decade of the twentieth century. Psychiatrists with specialized 
training in neurological conditions and mental illness represented a new brand of 
medical expertise and quickly acquired increased power among state authorities 
and the general public.48 Adolf Meyer, the prominent Johns Hopkins psychiatrist 
whose views both reflected and shaped attitudes in the discipline throughout this 
period, including in Canadian provinces, defined suicide behaviour as a strictly 
medical condition.
 In 1931, for example, he compared suicide to an infectious disease to make 
his point: “Nobody has a right to go where he pleases with diphtheria or small-
pox. Nobody has a right to display himself in the street in a delirium. Nobody 
has a right to attempt or to commit suicide.” The urge to commit suicide was a 
pathological state, an illness, and was under the domain of medicine. All decisions 
regarding suicide and attempted suicide, he proposed, were medical and could not 
be evaluated critically by clergy or a legal court. “Danger and threat of suicide 
46 QNA, 1953, no. 2425, man, 30 years old.
47 QNA, 1932, no. 2082, man, 43 years old.
48 William Menninger, Psychiatry: Its Evolution and Present Status (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1948); Susan Lamb, Pathologist of the Mind: Adolf Meyer and the Origins of American Psychiatry 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).
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can be foreseen by any experienced physician,” he wrote, “but a judge may want 
evidence of unmistakable threats and attempts made.”49 Medical personnel were 
authorized by law to quarantine patients to prevent the spread of disease, and 
Meyer believed that physicians were also responsible for preventing self-harm, 
using involuntary hospitalization if necessary. The suicidal patient was not fit to 
make decisions about what to do about this pathological condition, according to 
the so-called Dean of American Psychiatry, any more than a patient who contracted 
diphtheria.50
 As the rhetoric of psychiatrists such as Adolf Meyer made clear, psychiatric 
explanations of suicidal behaviour were widely assumed to diminish the criminal 
responsibility and culpability of suicidal individuals and subsequently to dilute 
the social stigma that traditionally had accompanied the crime of ending one’s 
own life. Psychiatric conceptualizations of suicide did not, however, abolish moral 
views on suicide and, moreover, tended to eliminate the possibility of free will in 
the decision to act. Explanations began to shift from felony to pathology around 
the mid-nineteenth century. However, mentalities changed slowly, and we have 
seen that many individuals, mainly before the Second World War, claimed full 
responsibility for their actions. Occasionally, they emphasized their own sanity to 
challenge the fact that their suicide would be classified by both state and medical 
authorities as an act committed “while of unsound mind,” a verdict commonly 
found in the coroners’ inquiries.
 Indeed, certain individuals declared that they fully understood what they 
were doing and were not mentally ill, as evidenced in the following excerpts of 
suicide notes: “I declare that I am dying with my full mental knowledge”51 and 
“The coroner, no doubt will pass the usual verdict – whilst of unsound mind etc. 
That will have to be queried as I wish it to be known that I have never been 
more sane then [sic] I am now....”52 Here, the writer’s claim to be of sound mind 
is explicit. Some individuals appeared insulted by the common perception that 
suicide was an uncontrollable compulsion resulting from an illness or abnormal 
mental state when they considered it a rational and decisive act. Others were less 
direct regarding their mental health and focused on trying to express clearly the 
possible causes of their actions. Some stated, among other things, that they felt 
disillusioned or “fed up” with life. By rationalizing their actions, they attempted 
to show that they knew what they were doing and why they were doing it, as the 
following examples show:
... please excuse my writing I am nervous. Don’t think I am crazy by doing this. I 
am intelligent to get rid of this kind of life a man that lives in this condition of life 
is really crazy....53
49 Adolf Meyer, “The Problems of the Physician Concerning the Criminal Insane and Borderline Cases,” 
Journal of American Medicine, vol. 54 (1910), p. 1931.
50 Lamb, Pathologist of the Mind, pp. 114-115.
51 QNA, 1921, no. 484, man 78 years old.
52 QNA, 1942, no. 514, woman, 33 years old.
53 QNA, 1951, no. 1172, man, 48 years old.
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The fates are against me in every way, it is no use fighting against fate, this is not 
through despondency, but disappointment, so I take this means to end my existence. 
You can dispose of my body as you wish, as I am only A Suicide....54
“Insane?” “Yes!” No. Just because I see no outlook in life for me and seeing nothing 
in life I take refuge in death? Just because of that I am insane? No. I am not crazy.55
The Coroner, ...
I am as sane as you get the police to act....
I am not insane
Disgusted.56
I am not insane, my feelings are hurt.57
I’m taking my life voluntary [sic] as I am sick of life.58
I am tired of life and I’m taking the easiest way out of it and am the cause of my 
own death.59
Despite efforts by suicidal individuals to express in writing, sometimes eloquently 
and sometimes crudely, sound rationales for their behaviour, their resistance to 
being placed in the category of “suicide while of unsound mind” was typically 
overlooked by authorities. In most cases, the authorities saw in suicide and 
attempted suicide evidence of insanity, showing the growing influence of the 
psychiatric discourses. In coroners’ inquiries the verdict “death by suicide” 
was consistently associated with a manifestation of lapsed reason, a temporary 
insanity, or a severe long-term mental illness. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that in 2007 the World Health Organization continued to link 95 per cent 
of suicides to mental illness.60 If we continue to view suicide solely from the 
psychiatric perspective, however, and to accept psychiatric explanations as an 
ultimate truth, we risk overlooking legitimate and important alternative readings 
of voluntary death.61
 We conclude this point with an excerpt from the only suicide note under study 
in which the individual claimed to be “mad.” The year was 1959, and the writer of 
this particular suicide note had a legal background. He took responsibility for his 
physical and psychological states, explaining the reasons for his actions to those 
authorities he imagined would evaluate his death:
54 QNA, 1900, no. 863, man, 29 years old.
55 QNA, 1921, no. 1178, man, young.
56 QNA, 1925, no. 813, man, 33 years old.
57 QNA, 1928, no. 126, woman, 38 years old.
58 QNA, 1931, no. 997, man, 42 years old.
59 QNA, 1933, no. 1739, man, 24 years old.
60 World Health Organization (WHO), Preventing Suicide: A Global Imperative (2014).
61 Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, History and Truth, p. 66.
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I have terminal cancer, and have been suffering from severe depression for two 
months. I can suffer no longer – I ask my dear wife, my parents and my friends to 
forgive me.
Farewell [name]
n.b. this weapon is loaded and must be handled with care.
No investigation is necessary. This is a case of madness.62
Conclusion: The Unbearable Idea of Voluntary Death
When we focus only on institutional discourses (psychiatric, legal, religious) 
to understand changes in social reactions to suicide, we overlook discourses 
that are albeit less visible, just as revealing of the evolution of perceptions: 
that of the suicidal individuals themselves. Those who committed suicide left 
written testimonials to claim responsibility for their actions, to highlight taboos 
surrounding it, or to challenge the idea that they took their lives in a moment 
of madness, however temporary. Mental disorders, it has been said time and 
again, often serve to deny people’s criminal and personal responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions. It seems that the stigma of madness, however, was 
equally inappropriate in the eyes of many individuals who ended their lives and 
demanded that authorities recognize their rationality and “free will.” From the 
perspective of many of these individuals, they decided to free themselves from 
otherwise irresolvable difficulties of life by means of a profoundly personal, 
private, and wilful act.
 The written testimonies produced by people who have succeeded in or 
attempted to end their own lives voluntarily are scant, incomplete, and unevenly 
distributed across diverse archival collections. Using these sources we cannot 
pinpoint precisely the intentions of those who endeavoured to take their own 
lives, nor has it been our aim to pursue such a quest for meaning. Rather, the 
goal was to give voice to historical actors who used their final words to claim 
personal responsibility for their suicides, to declare that rational thought and 
free will informed their decisions, and to insist that neither legal nor psychiatric 
authorities exercised ultimate power over their deaths. “Suicide,” the Swedish 
writer Stig Dagerman suggested, “is the only proof of human freedom.”63 The 
narratives of responsibility that emerged from this analysis of suicide notes written 
by individuals in Montreal, Quebec, between 1892 and 1960 indicate that many 
suicidal individuals throughout the twentieth century intended to exercise that 
freedom. To emphasize this important point, we conclude with the final testimony 
of J. Thompson, who ended his life voluntarily in Montreal on November 13, 
1959:
I believe that death need not be frightening. People who are not satisfied with life 
wish for death. Others, like myself, who feel that they have done what good they 
can, and who have happy memories of a full life and many friends, would like to 
move along and make room in a crowded world for ones who are just entering the 
62 QNA, 1958, no. 2281, man, 60 years old.
63 Stig Dagerman, Notre besoin de consolation est impossible à rassasier (Paris: Actes Sud, trans. Philippe 
Bouquet, 1993 [1952]).
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new era. It is really too bad that a curse has been put on voluntary death. Perhaps, 
in the Bright new world, a loaded revolver or a simple pill in a special room will be 
available at all times for those who wish it.64
64 QNA, 1959, no. 4306, man, 47 years old.
